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Lacking a clear legal definition, the conceptualization 
and application of durable solutions have been highly 
influenced by states’ interests that were often at odds with 
humanitarian concerns on refugee protection . During the 
Cold War resettlement was perceived as the preferred dur-
able solution, although it was selectively applied to differ-
ent refugee crises in the South . With the asylum crisis in 
the 1980s and the end of the Cold War, a new agenda of 
containment emerged as Northern countries’ interest in 
receiving refugees declined . During the 1990s voluntary 
repatriation emerged as a new preferred solution and there 
was an effort to redefine and adapt resettlement to a new 
context . This process focused on detaching resettlement 
from its previous political and immigration character and 
redefining it as an exclusive protection tool and instrument 
of international co-operation . Hence, resettlement in the 
post-Cold War era is characterized by depoliticization, a 
smaller number of beneficiaries, and geographic expansion . 
However, it is important to critically question whether such 
depoliticization has happened in fact, the reasons behind 
it, and its relation to North-South politics and contain-
ment strategies .
Résumé
Faute d’une définition juridique claire, la conceptualisation 
et l’application de solutions durables à la réinstallation ont 
été fortement influencées par des intérêts étatiques souvent 
en contradiction avec les préoccupations humanitaires sur 
la protection des réfugiés . Durant la guerre froide, la réins-
tallation paraissait la solution durable la plus souhaitable, 
bien qu’appliquée de façon ponctuelle aux différentes crises 
de réfugiés dans le Sud . Un nouveau programme de confi-
nement apparaît lors de la crise de l’asile des années 1980 et 
la fin de la guerre froide quand diminue la volonté des pays 
du Nord à accueillir les demandeurs d’asile . Le rapatrie-
ment volontaire apparaît au cours des années 1990 comme 
nouvelle solution de préférence . On tente alors de redéfinir 
la réinstallation et de l’adapter au nouveau contexte . Ce 
processus est axé sur une rupture de la réinstallation avec 
ses aspects politique et migratoire précédents et sa redéfi-
nition en tant qu’outil exclusif de protection et instrument 
de la coopération internationale . Ainsi, la réinstallation à 
l’ère de l’après-guerre froide se caractérise par la dépolitisa-
tion, la réduction du nombre de bénéficiaires et l’expansion 
géographique . Toutefois, il est essentiel de déterminer de 
façon critique si cette dépolitisation s’est réellement faite, 
les raisons qui la sous-tendent et sa relation à la politique 
Nord-Sud et aux stratégies de confinement .
Introduction
Research and policy making in forced migration commonly 
refer to the concept of durable solutions and its three options: 
local integration, resettlement, and voluntary repatria-
tion. However, these concepts find loose support from legal 
instruments and are mainly derived from the regular prac-
tice of states and international organizations. Consequently, 
they are embedded in a complex set of political, economic, 
and strategic interests that often go far beyond humanitar-
ian concerns on refugees’ protection. In that sense, the use 
of resettlement, especially in North-South relations, has 
changed from the Cold War period to the present, allegedly 
evolving from a political instrument to a protection tool. 
The present paper will examine the question that although 
the very concept of “refugee” is intimately linked to polit-
ical upheavals and interests, the way refuges have been dealt 
with (i .e . the durable solutions offered) has been influenced 
by different explicit and implicit interests that have varied 
over time in speech and practice.
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As the present refugee regime was initially designed in 
the early days of the Cold War, the lack of a precise defin-
ition of durable solutions and the relationship between them 
enabled states to manipulate their use according to political, 
economic, and ideological interests. Hence, during the early 
1950s, resettlement was praised as not only the preferred 
durable solution, but the only viable one, and it played an 
important role in transferring refugee populations from 
communist countries.
In the following decades forced displacement increased 
dramatically in the global South, and the responses pro-
vided to refugee influxes continued to be highly embedded 
in Cold War political and strategic interests, so that different 
refugee crises received differing “solutions.” With the end of 
the Cold War and the asylum crisis initiated in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, Northern states had a declining interest in 
receiving refugees. Consequently, containment strategies 
gained importance and during the late 1980s and 1990s 
there was a process to redefine durable solutions available 
to refugees.
In this process, voluntary repatriation replaced resettle-
ment as the preferred durable solution and there were con-
sistent efforts to detach resettlement from its previous fea-
ture of a political and migration instrument and (re)define 
it as a protection tool. Under this approach resettlement 
would serve a smaller number of refugees, but would obey 
strict protection criteria that uphold the safety and welfare 
of refugees.
If resettlement lost space in a containment context, why 
was it never abandoned by states and international organ-
izations? First of all, even though the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had a crucial role in 
advocating for voluntary repatriation as the preferred dur-
able solution, it also attempted to maintain resettlement 
as an option available through a process to redefine it and 
adapt it to new circumstances. An important consequence 
of this process was the focus on protection and international 
co-operation, culminating in an expansion of resettlement 
to the global South.
Second, even in a containment context, Northern coun-
tries still receive refugees due to different reasons, including 
political and foreign policy interests, domestic pressure, eco-
nomic interests, and humanitarian concern. More import-
ant, amidst accusations of uncontrolled immigrants’ and 
asylum-seekers’ entry, resettlement enables states to regain 
control over refugee admission.
It can be argued that redefining resettlement exclusively 
as a protection tool was exactly what enabled its continued 
use, geographically expanded yet numerically reduced. 
However, one can critically analyze the motivations behind 
it, whether such depoliticization actually happened, and 
how it impacted refugee issues in North-South relations. 
In that sense, the UNHCR-led process to redefine resettle-
ment was an effort to reposition durable solutions in line 
with changing interests of states. Moreover, resettlement is 
still applied according interests that are not purely humani-
tarian or protection, as different refugee populations receive 
different solutions. Finally, although emerging resettlement 
programs in the South are praised as the best example of 
resettlement as a protection tool, it is important to situate 
them in broader North-South relations and containment 
strategies.
The paper has six sections. The first examines how the 
resettlement concept, in the absence of legal instruments, 
was forged and promoted as the most desirable solution in 
the early days of the Cold War. The following section will 
show how the political use of resettlement evolved along with 
the Cold War and how it was selectively applied to distinct 
situations. The third part briefly explains the asylum crisis 
experienced in the late 1970s and 1980s and how it affected 
the conceptualization of durable solutions and resettlement. 
Section four will analyze the effort to redefine durable solu-
tions and the relationship between them, focusing on the 
process of depoliticizing resettlement. The next part will 
examine the characteristics of resettlement in the post–Cold 
War era and how they differ from previous years. The final 
section will analyze the complex set of factors that explain 
why Northern countries continue to use resettlement even 
in a context of containment and decreasing interest in inter-
national co-operation. The paper will conclude with some 
final critical remarks and challenges for the future.
Defining Resettlement during the Early Cold War: 
The Preferred Solution
The International Thesaurus of Refugee Terminology (ITRT)1 
defines “resettlement” as “the durable settlement of refugees 
in a country other than the country of refuge.” However, 
it should be noted that such definition is derived from the 
practice of states and UNHCR guidelines rather than an 
international legal instrument. The milestone of refugee 
protection, the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees, is silent on a precise definition not only of resettle-
ment, but of the three-fold durable solutions concept as a 
whole. Resettlement is mentioned only in Article 30, claim-
ing that states should facilitate the transfer of assets of reset-
tled refugees.
A precise definition of resettlement is also lacking in 
the UNHCR 1950 Statute. As per its Article 1, the agency is 
mandated to seek permanent solutions for refugees, such as 
“the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, or their assimi-
lation within new national communities.” However, it is 
open to interpretation whether the last part refers to both 
Volume 26 Refuge Number 1
92
Refuge26-1.indd   92 8/13/10   9:10:17 PM
local integration in the first country of asylum and resettle-
ment in a third country.
Lacking a clear definition, resettlement has been 
manipulated as a major tool for states to apply discretion-
ary policies, according to interests that are often at odds 
with the concern with refugees’ protection. Specific polit-
ical and economic interests in a given time shaped the con-
cepts and solutions provided to refugees, which proved to 
be very flexible regarding different populations and differ-
ent periods.
As the refugee regime was tailored at the beginning of the 
Cold War with a strong Eurocentric character,2 repatriation 
was obviously not an option. Resettlement was then the per-
fect durable solution for refugees due to the combination of 
strategic interests (recovery and regional stability in Europe), 
economic interests (immigrant workforce), and ideological 
interests (supporting defection from Communist states).3 
Moreover, the US leadership had an important role in this 
system, as it was willing and able to bear the bulk of costs 
related to the reception of refugees, offering large resettle-
ment quotas and promoting a similar welcoming position 
from other Western governments.
During the 1950s and early 1960s resettlement had two 
main characteristics. First, it bypassed UNHCR because at 
the beginning it was perceived that the agency’s clients were 
only the refugees displaced by the war who still remained in 
Europe. The US had a great interest in closely managing the 
resettlement of refugees from communist countries, and it 
did so through two different agencies: the Intergovernmental 
Committee for European Migration (ICEM, created in 1951) 
and the United States Escapee Program (USEP, officially 
established in 1952, although it had operated since 1949). 
Differently from UNHCR in its early days, those agencies 
received full funding from the US.4
Second, resettlement activities were totally concentrated 
in Europe. During the Berlin crisis in 1953 and through-
out the decade until the Berlin Wall was built in 1961, 
some 3.5 million people fled from East to West Germany 
and some were resettled farther away. The largest refugee 
crisis of this period and the first massive resettlement oper-
ation occurred after the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. 
Although the US was initially reluctant to resettle refugees 
from Yugoslavia, a communist country of first asylum, a 
total of some 180,000 Hungarian were resettled in thirty-
seven countries.5 The receptiveness was explained both by 
Cold War political and ideological interests and economic 
interests, since the Hungarians were a “model immigration 
group” composed of skilled workers.6
It is important to note that during the Hungarian crisis 
UNHCR played an important role and began to be recog-
nized by the US as a relevant actor in the bipolar context. 
Since then the US government started to contribute finan-
cially to UNHCR, becoming its major donor and enabling 
the agency to expand its personnel and capacity in the fol-
lowing decades.
Resettlement and Cold War Politics  
in the Global South
During the late 1960s and the 1970s the decolonization pro-
cess caused conflicts and massive displacement in the global 
South, especially in Africa and Asia, which ultimately altered 
the focus of refugee protection. According to Loescher, 
“by 73, the US began to refocus its refugee programs from 
Europe to the rest of the world, following the global expan-
sion of its foreign policy and security commitments.”7
As refugee influxes and global responses to them started 
to shift into the South, resettlement remained an import-
ant solution. However, its use in specific refugee crises was 
shaped by economic and principally by political interests of 
Northern states. This can be exemplified by the analysis of 
three major refugee crises during the 1970s: in Uganda, the 
Southern Cone of Latin America, and Indochina.
In 1972 the Ugandan president Idi Amin decided to expel 
all people of Asian derivation. As a consequence, more than 
40,000 people fled the country, including some 7,000 made 
stateless. UNHCR’s appeal for resettlement quotas received 
a quick and welcoming response from the international 
community and by the end of 1974 all expelled persons were 
resettled in twenty-five different countries.8
In the same period a refugee crisis erupted in the 
Southern Cone of Latin America as almost all countries in 
the region were under authoritarian military governments. 
More than 200,000 refugees fled Chile after the military 
coup in 1973, including refugees who were living there after 
escaping from similar coups in neighbouring countries.9 
As military regimes in different countries were allied, refu-
gees were targeted in the whole region and there was no safe 
haven. Therefore, the solution sought for those refugees was 
predominantly resettlement outside South America, and the 
UNHCR’s appeals were generously answered by European 
countries.10
Nevertheless, the same attitude was not observed from 
the US, since those refugees were fleeing Washington-
supported regimes, under accusations of Communist 
affiliation. “The US virtually ignored appeals for resettle-
ment and it even refused to provide anything to support 
ICEM programs to finance resettlement.”11 In mid-1975 
the US government agreed to receive 400 refugees from the 
Southern Cone, but the strict screening procedures delayed 
the resettlement process and limited the number of refu-
gees actually admitted to US soil.12 As a consequence of the 
US policy, most refugees relocated themselves within the 
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region and external resettlement was an option for few of 
them. By the end of the 1970s some 15,000 South American 
refugees were resettled in forty-four countries, mostly in 
Western Europe.13
The third refugee crisis during the late 1970s and the 
1980s, in Indochina, turned out to be the largest and most 
expensive resettlement operation in history. Due to strug-
gles between Communist revolutionaries and US-supported 
counter-revolutionaries, millions of Vietnamese, Laotians, 
and Cambodians were caught amidst fire and displaced. 
Neighbouring countries such as Thailand and Malaysia 
were overwhelmed with the so-called “boat people” and 
urged Northern support to address the situation, mainly 
through resettlement. The US was the leading country to 
support the assistance and resettlement of Indochinese refu-
gees, since such an operation was perceived as emblematic 
in the context of the “new Cold War” in the early 1980s.14 
Furthermore, American society was particularly sensitive 
to the issue of Vietnamese refugees, a position increasingly 
voiced by rising transnational human rights networks.
Initially other Northern countries, especially in Europe, 
believed that the crisis was a “US problem”15 and the US 
struggled to convince them that resettlement was the best 
solution for Indochinese refugees. Even though it initially 
sustained the idea that repatriation would be the most 
adequate solution for refugees in the region, UNHCR ultim-
ately supported this policy, promoting two international 
conferences in Geneva and the Comprehensive Plan of 
Action for Indochinese Refugees.16 As a result of this effort, 
by the mid-1990s some 1.3 million Indochinese refugees 
were resettled.17 The US was obviously the most generous 
country, and from just 1975 to 1985 it received some 750,000 
resettled refugees.18
The three cases exemplify how resettlement of refugees 
was an important political instrument within Cold War 
politics. In the Ugandan case, resettlement countries were 
eager to offer support to persecuted populations as part of 
their effort to contain Communist expansion in Africa. In 
the Latin American case, resettlement was offered as a much 
more limited possibility, since most refugees were fleeing 
Western-allied regimes. Finally, receiving Indochinese refu-
gees through resettlement was perceived as an inexorable 
part of Cold War politics in the region and the resettlement 
response was the widest possible. However, it is import-
ant to note that despite its political manipulation, confer-
ring different levels of usage in different situation (or even 
within the same situation), resettlement in this period was 
the preferred and in some cases the only durable solution 
considered by major powers.
The Asylum Crisis and Its Impact on Durable 
Solutions
From the late 1970s and early 1980s on, Northern states’ 
willingness to receive refugees decreased dramatically due 
to economic, social, and political transformations in the 
international scenario and domestic politics. The so-called 
asylum crisis brought about containment policies and a 
redefinition of the concepts of durable solutions and the role 
of resettlement.
With global economic recession, refugees and migrants 
in general were no longer a welcome workforce, but rather a 
threat to the shrinking labour market and welfare system.19 
The globalization process facilitated communications and 
transport and also increased—and made more visible—
the gap between North and South, fostering the desire of 
Southern citizens to migrate.20 Refugees and asylum seek-
ers started to arrive directly in Northern territory in mixed 
movements along with other migrants. Unprecedented 
numbers of arrivals triggered popular discontent, causing 
electoral pressure for restrictive measures.21 Finally, the end 
of the Cold War altered one of the most important foun-
dations of the refugee regime. Without the geostrategic 
motivation of promoting defection from communism, gov-
ernments had little interest in receiving refugees into their 
territories22 and lost their main argument for gathering 
internal consensus and acceptance.
The asylum crisis led to new approaches to refugee issues 
centred on containment. There was a proliferation of meas-
ures to restrict the granting of asylum and access to ter-
ritory,23 as well as an effort to contain refugee influxes in 
the global South as much as possible. Such new approaches 
affected the conceptualization and application of dur-
able solutions in three manners. First, there was a renewed 
focus on in-country operations, including maintaining 
refugees within their regions of origin and emphasizing 
repatriation.
Second, international co-operation on refugee issues 
became increasingly problematic as Southern states were 
overwhelmed with the bulk of refugee flows and Northern 
countries had fewer incentives to offer resettlement quotas 
and financial resources. As asserted by Gibney, “Western 
states claim that refugees in the South were too numerous 
to be assisted through resettlement schemes and, in any 
respect were not fleeing persecution (…).”24
Finally, as the numbers of asylum seekers increased, 
there was a general perception that Northern states lost 
control over refugee arrivals, especially in comparison with 
resettlement programs implemented in preceding years.25 
The arrival of asylumseekers is spontaneous and unpredict-
able, in opposition to organized and predictable resettle-
ment programs, through which governments may literally 
Volume 26 Refuge Number 1
94
Refuge26-1.indd   94 8/13/10   9:10:17 PM
chose which refugees they want to receive, how many, and 
when.26 In theory resettlement could be an opportunity for 
states to regain their lost control over refugee issues, but in 
light of decreasing external incentives and domestic pres-
sure, resettlement needed to be re-shaped as a more precise 
and explicitly protection-oriented tool in order to maintain 
its role as a durable solution.
(Re)defining Durable Solutions and Resettlement: 
A Protection Tool?
A major consequence of the asylum crisis was a redefini-
tion of the concept of durable solutions and the relation-
ship between them. It was not a formal process but rather 
an almost natural outcome of states’ policies and practices. 
In the post–Cold War order with low incentives for North-
South co-operation resettlement was no longer the preferred 
durable solution for refugees. In that sense, since the late 
1980s voluntary repatriation emerged as the natural and 
most adequate solution for most situations of displacement. 
Such a position was actively promoted by UNHCR, in line 
with the political agenda of major powers who wanted to 
maintain refugees in their regions of origin. Former High 
Commissioner Sadako Ogata had a crucial role in this 
approach and UNHCR established an explicit hierarchy of 
durable solutions27 and went as far as to declare the 1990s 
as “the decade of voluntary repatriation.” Indeed, from 1991 
to 1996 some 9 million refugees were repatriated, compared 
to only 1.2 million during the period 1985–1990.28 However, 
this approach received extensive criticism, including the 
criticism that UNHCR was drifting away from its original 
protection mandate29 and that the levels of voluntariness 
could be highly debated in several repatriation operations.30
While in-country operations and repatriation gained 
greater relevance, the discourse around the use of resettle-
ment became somewhat conservative. In the process of 
redefining durable solutions, resettlement was increasingly 
seen as costly in terms of resources and cultural adapta-
tion, which in technical terms is true, although such con-
cern was never an issue during the precedent “resettlement 
period.”31 During its 42nd Session in 1991, the UNHCR’s 
Executive Committee (ExCom) approved its first conclu-
sion on international protection dealing solely with resettle-
ment, which established a hierarchy between durable solu-
tions: “UNHCR pursues resettlement only as a last resort, 
when neither voluntary repatriation nor local integration is 
possible, when it is in the best interests of the refugees and 
where appropriate.”32
Moreover, it was explicitly recognized that in preceding 
decades resettlement was more a migration program than 
a protection tool. This was made clear during the same 
ExCom meeting in 1991, when High Commissioner Ogata 
affirmed that differently from massive resettlement oper-
ations experienced during the 1980s and the previous dec-
ades, resettlement operations in the 1990s were “likely to be 
more protection oriented and could often involve smaller 
numbers.”33. Therefore, in response to the decrease in immi-
gration-driven resettlement, UNHCR started to apply its 
own protection-related criteria for a more diverse, although 
numerically limited, group of refugees.34 Compared with 
voluntary repatriation, from 1997 to 2006, for each refugee 
resettled, fourteen were repatriated.35
However, aware that such strong statements could create 
an idea that resettlement was a less important or effective 
solution and jeopardize its very existence, ExCom members 
and UNHCR toned down their approach. Later declarations 
emphasized that for some refugees at high risk in the coun-
try of first asylum and where repatriation is not a possibil-
ity, resettlement can in fact provide the most adequate form 
of protection. UNHCR publicly declared that the reduc-
tion in the number of refugees resettled during the early 
1990s was mainly due to the conclusion of its operations in 
Southeast Asia and did not “reflect any fundamental change 
in the criteria which UNHCR uses to identify candidates for 
resettlement.”36
The emergence of new refugee crises in different parts of 
the world during the 1990s revealed that resettlement could 
still have an important role in the post–Cold War order. 
However, in a scenario where Northern countries had few 
incentives to receive refugees and to cooperate with over-
whelmed Southern countries of first asylum, resettlement 
had to be reshaped and adapted to these new circumstances 
if it were to maintain its relevance. This effort was primarily 
led by UNHCR and focused on reinvigorating resettlement 
in a new context, emphasizing its protection role over polit-
ical usage and offering incentives for states’ co-operation.
Therefore, the concept was developed that resettlement 
would serve a three-fold purpose: durable solution, protec-
tion tool, and instrument of international solidarity. First, 
resettlement as a durable solution means that in some 
cases when there is continued cross-border persecution, 
extreme impediments to local integration, and impossibil-
ity of repatriation, resettlement is the best or even the only 
viable solution for refugees. Thus, resettlement should be an 
integral part of the comprehensive set of responses applied 
to each refugee situation, along with the other durable 
solutions. Such an approach relates to the strategic use of 
resettlement, which refers to its ability to benefit other refu-
gees beyond those being resettled, as well as the host and 
neighbouring states. As large refugee populations challenge 
socio-economic structures and regional stability, resettle-
ment can be an important means to alleviate the pressure on 
countries of first asylum.
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Second, resettlement as a protection tool implied a 
greater focus on the individual needs of refugees rather than 
states’ political and economic interests. To that end, resettle-
ment should be based on well-defined criteria and required 
important changes in procedures. Precise criteria to assess 
refugees’ need for resettlement were established, namely: 
legal and physical protection needs (including threat of 
refoulement), lack of integration prospects, survivors of vio-
lence and torture, women at risk, children and adolescents 
(especially unaccompanied minors), older refugees, med-
ical needs, and family reunification. As the establishment 
of such criteria consolidated the transformation of resettle-
ment from immigration to protection-driven, resettlement 
procedures also changed, evolving from mechanical group 
processing to case-by-case assessments.
Finally, resettlement is an instrument of international 
solidarity and burden/responsibility-sharing, as it offers sup-
port to overwhelmed first countries of asylum, especially in 
situations of protracted displacement. Since the mid-1990s 
UNHCR has led initiatives to encourage tripartite co-oper-
ation between the agency, states, and civil society organiza-
tions. As a result, a Working Group on Resettlement and a 
formal process of consultation with governments and NGOs 
were established in 1995. Such consultations were held on a 
yearly base and in 2001 it was renamed Annual Tripartite 
Consultations on Resettlement (ATC).
A major initiative aiming at promoting incentives for 
international co-operation, especially North-South, was the 
Convention Plus process, lead by UNHCR between 2001 
and 2005. The strategic use of resettlement was one of the 
three topics in which multilateral agreements were sought. A 
Core Group was established in Geneva under the leadership 
of the government of Canada, which gathered states, con-
cerned international organizations, and civil society entities. 
Although the initiative did not reach the intended “generic 
agreements,” the resettlement strand was considered the most 
successful one, because it provided a Multilateral Framework 
of Understandings, even though this concrete outcome was 
considered a “modest and uncontroversial statement.”37
A New Paradigm? Resettlement in the Post–Cold 
War Era
Although it has undergone some changes in its concept and 
positioning vis-à-vis the other durable solutions available to 
refugees, it is unquestionable that resettlement remains an 
important and integral part of the refugee protection regime. 
It continues to benefit a large number of refugees yearly and 
to be the subject of discussion in different international fora 
and academic circles. However, how does resettlement in 
the post–Cold War order differ from resettlement in previ-
ous years?
Resettlement in this new context can be said to have 
three main characteristics. The first one refers to its concept. 
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s resettlement has been pre-
cisely defined in international instruments which, although 
non-binding, enabled a more harmonized and predictable 
use. Resettlement now has precise criteria, procedures, and 
definition of the roles of actors involved. However, maybe the 
most significant change in the conceptualization of resettle-
ment has been its depoliticization. While defining its three-
fold purpose, resettlement has been detached from its previ-
ous political and immigration-driven use and redefined in 
exclusive terms of protection instrument.
Second, compared with previous decades, resettlement 
has in fact numerically decreased. In 1979, resettlement was 
the solution for one in every twenty refugees but by 1996, the 
proportion was one in every four hundred.38 This trend can 
still be observed as the total number of resettled refugees 
in 2006 was 11 per cent lower than in the previous year. As 
previously discussed, defining resettlement as a protection 
tool essentially means serving smaller numbers of refugees, 
since criteria and procedures are refined. Better screening 
procedures have also become an increased concern because 
of fraud and misuse,39 especially after the 1999 resettlement 
scandal in Kenya.
However, other factors also explain the reduced numbers 
of resettlement in the present context. Confronted by large 
numbers of asylum seekers arriving directly in their territor-
ies, Northern states have offered fewer resettlement places, 
in an attempt to “balance” the total number of refugees. This 
often implicit correlation between resettlement and asylum 
policies can be exemplified by the fact that adding resettle-
ment and direct arrivals, the US and Western Europe admit 
roughly the same number of refugees, even though the US 
has a stronger resettlement program.40
Following 9/11 and the Global War on Terror, refugee 
policies are increasingly in line with security concerns, 
which has also affected the number of refugees admitted 
through resettlement. For instance, the US government 
has applied tighter screening procedures in its resettlement 
programs and therefore it has struggled to fulfill its annual 
resettlement quotas. This is the case especially for refugees 
from the Middle East and refugees that allegedly support 
Washington-determined “terrorist organizations” such as 
Colombian or Sri Lankan refugees. For instance, for fiscal 
year 2008 the US has established a ceiling (quota) of 70,000 
refugees, but had only received 48,282 (68.9 per cent).41
Finally, the third characteristic of resettlement in the 
post–Cold War order is its geographic expansion beyond the 
traditional resettlement countries. Traditionally there were 
ten resettlement countries which offered annual resettle-
ment quotas42 and other countries offered resettlement 
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places answering ad hoc UNHCR appeals. Expanding and 
diversifying resettlement opportunities were a crucial part 
of the 1990s Alexander Betts (2008) ‘Towards a “Soft Law” 
Framework for the Protection of Vulnerable Migrants,’ New 
Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper 162, UNHCR, 
Geneva effort to redefine resettlement as a protection tool 
and instrument of international co-operation.
Following UNHCR consultations, since 1996 seven new 
countries have established resettlement programs, although 
only five remain operative. Although two countries are from 
the global North (Iceland and Ireland), the main innova-
tion is the emergence of Southern countries of resettlement. 
Between 1998 and 2001 Benin and Burkina Faso received 226 
refugees, mainly from other African countries. However, a 
2003 evaluation found overall “disappointing results”43 and 
the program in both countries was discontinued.
Despite the unsuccessful pilot project in Africa, UNHCR 
further promoted other resettlement initiatives in the global 
South, focusing on Latin America. Since 2002 and until the 
end of 2007, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina have received some 
1,000 resettled refugees.44 The program in such countries 
remains operative and it has already expanded beyond its 
initial scope: although the main beneficiaries of the resettle-
ment program in Latin America are Colombian refugees, 
some 100 Palestinian refugees have also been admitted.
Explaining the Continued Use of Resettlement
It has been argued that despite its reduced numbers and a 
new façade, resettlement is still an important part of the pro-
tection regime. However, an important question should be 
asked regarding its continued use: if the Cold War interests 
no longer exist and Northern states are increasingly unwill-
ing to receive refugees, why do they keep resettling?
First of all, UNHCR’s catalytic role must be recognized. 
Although the agency has followed states’ political interest 
in replacing voluntary repatriation as the preferred dur-
able solution, it has also remained aware of the importance 
resettlement has in several refugee situations. As new refu-
gee crises erupt worldwide and in a context of increasing 
containment, it is important that resettlement remains an 
option of safe haven to refugees. Nevertheless, aware that 
incentives for international co-operation and provision of 
resettlement have changed since the end of the Cold War, 
UNHCR has attempted to offer alternative incentives, mostly 
by detaching resettlement from its previous clear political 
and immigration nature and redefining it as an exclusive 
political tool. This official depoliticization of resettlement 
would ensure that states remain committed to it.
Second, as mentioned before, with the asylum crisis there 
was a generalized perception that Northern states have lost 
control over the entry of immigrants and refugees. For these 
governments, resettlement is a means to uphold their inter-
national commitments towards refugee protection while 
maintaining their control over which refugees are admitted, 
how many, and when. Hence, the offer of resettlement has 
been used to justify stricter policies regarding admission and 
the granting of asylum. Furthermore, resettlement is useful 
to reinforce to the domestic public the idea that resettlement 
and asylum are totally different areas of refugee protec-
tion. For instance, the US maintains two strictly different 
concepts that embody distinct normative and institutional 
frameworks. “Refugee” refers to a resettled refugee and 
“asylee” or “asylum-seeker” to a person claiming protection 
directly on US soil.45 Similarly, in Western Europe, resettle-
ment has been used to clarify and legitimize the distinction 
between “true” and “bogus” refugees.46
Finally, although the asylum crisis reduced Northern 
states’ willingness to receive refugees and immigrants 
in general, no country so far has applied a strict no-entry 
policy. Continued refugee admissions can be explained by a 
complex combination of several interests, such as humani-
tarian concerns and domestic pressure, as well as economic, 
political, and foreign policy interests.
States have a humanitarian interest in admitting refu-
gees according to their international commitments as 
signatories of international instruments such as the 1951 
Refugee Convention. In most cases, such commitments 
have been internalized by domestic legislation and compli-
ance with them is overseen by national and regional courts. 
Nevertheless, this humanitarian concern has a limited role, 
since states often circumvent their international obligations 
by preventing access to territory or creating new categor-
ies and concepts.47 The inconsistent offer of resettlement to 
different refugee populations also reveals that humanitar-
ian concerns have only marginally influenced resettlement 
programs.
Pressure from domestic groups and economic interests 
have also influenced states’ refugee policies.48 Resettlement 
admissions can be influenced by lobby groups from refugee 
populations already present in the country or by economic 
groups interested in attracting or avoiding specific skills. In 
a broader sense, the domestic public also influences immi-
gration and refugee policies through electoral pressures.
Finally, although resettlement has been redefined as a 
protection tool disentangled from political interests, they 
still play a crucial role in determining whether resettlement 
will be applied, to which populations, and to what extent. 
In that sense, little has changed from Cold War period. For 
instance, the main category of refugees admitted for resettle-
ment in the US is comprised of those falling within certain 
ethnic groups and/or country of first asylum.49 Although in 
consultation with other actors, the Department of State is 
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responsible for deciding which groups are included in the 
annual resettlement quota, which demonstrates the highly 
political character of such decisions.
Critical Analysis and Final Remarks
Beyond debates on manipulation of resettlement policies, 
it is fundamental to recognize the generosity of Northern 
states. It is undeniable that resettlement has been a life-
changing or even life-saving instrument for many refugees 
throughout history. Since the late 1970s, more than 250,000 
refugees have been admitted in Western Europe through 
UNHCR-led resettlement operations50 and the US alone 
has resettled over two million refugees, more than all other 
resettlement countries together.51
Resettlement depoliticization during the 1990s and 
2000s enabled it to remain relevant in the refugee protec-
tion regime. Its redefinition had positive effects, especially 
bringing more transparency to the process with the estab-
lishment of precise criteria and procedures. The focus on 
solidarity and responsibility-sharing may offer an oppor-
tunity to enhance international co-operation (especially 
North-South) in other areas of refugee protection.
However, if this depoliticization had positive impacts, 
some critical observations must be made. First of all, it is 
important to bear in mind the motives behind the redefini-
tion of resettlement from a political instrument to a pro-
tection tool. As UNHCR led this effort, it was responding 
to new interests and political relations between states, 
adapting resettlement to a political context characterized 
by containment and decreased incentives for international 
co-operation. It can be said then that the depoliticization 
process was essentially politically motivated.
Furthermore, the extent to which this depoliticization 
is real is also debatable. As demonstrated before, despite 
the exclusive protection facade adopted after the end of the 
Cold War, resettlement programs are still discretionary and 
respond to a set of concerns and interests that go far beyond 
their strict use as a protection tool. This is corroborated by 
the inconsistent application of resettlement policies towards 
different refugee policies and states’ difficulties in fulfilling 
annual resettlement quotas. For instance, in 2006 some 
29,600 refugees were resettled through UNHCR programs 
and a further 71,700 were resettled outside the agency,52 
which demonstrates that traditional resettlement countries 
still keep a largely discretionary policy regarding resettle-
ment and prefer to maintain their own channels and agen-
cies, using UNHCR only to some extent.
Another important question refers to how the new 
approach to resettlement fits into North-South politics. 
Despite the non-political discourse, resettlement is deeply 
entangled in containment policies. The concept of strategic 
use of resettlement may conceal the interest in maintaining 
refugees in their regions ,not to facilitate future repatriation, 
but rather to avoid their further movement to Northern 
countries. Besides, according to van Selm, especially in 
Europe several actors have tried to “sell” resettlement as a 
tool to reduce the arrival of asylum-seekers,53 which repre-
sents a great risk not only of resettlement misuse, but to the 
integrity of the protection regime.
The emerging resettlement programs in the global South 
also deserve a critical analysis. Southern countries already 
host the majority of refugees in the world, but under an 
international solidarity discourse they are assuming yet 
another obligation through resettlement. Although Southern 
resettlement countries receive a much smaller number of 
refugees, the initiative reveals that the level of responsibility 
sharing and international co-operation in refugee issues is 
still unfair and needs to be further developed.
It is interesting then to argue why Southern countries join 
such initiatives. Their incentives include increased inter-
national visibility and prestige, promoted by the catalytic 
role of UNHCR. The financial cost to these governments 
is very limited, as the programs are almost fully funded by 
UNHCR and Northern countries, which imposes challen-
ges regarding ownership and long-term sustainability. The 
countries with most successful programs are those with 
medium levels of economic development and small num-
bers of refugees in general, which also raises the questions 
of feasibility and sustainability of resettlement in Southern 
countries lacking adequate levels of economic development 
and resources. Furthermore, an external and comprehensive 
evaluation of the resettlement programme in Latin America 
has not yet been conducted and its accurate level of success 
is still unknown.
The real interests of Northern countries in supporting 
resettlement in developing countries can also be questioned. 
As mentioned, promoting intra-regional resettlement may 
corroborate broader containment strategies to avoid further 
refugee movements heading North. As Southern resettle-
ment programs are financially and conceptually supported 
by UNHCR and Northern states, it is important that this 
is not perceived as an excuse to decrease international co-
operation or as Northern countries “paying” to resettle refu-
gees away from their territories in order to avoid domestic 
pressures.
In conclusion, some fundamental challenges are still to 
be addressed by resettlement in the present context. In a 
general environment of containment, the number of official 
refugees is declining as the number of Internally Displaced 
People (IDPs) and others in need of international protection 
increases. Given the current legal and institutional frame-
works, resettlement is not a viable option for most of these 
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populations, even though it could be the best or only solu-
tion in several cases.
Finally, resettlement is still not an effective protection 
tool for protracted displacement situations. Even when a 
displacement crisis initially received support from Northern 
countries through resettlement places, this willingness 
tends to decline over time and large populations remain in 
a deteriorating situation. Those refugee groups that have 
little political leverage or that have long been forgotten by 
the media and donors are likely to remain in a situation of 
limbo, as resettlement remains a forgone option.
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